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DEADLINES AS BEHAVIOR IN DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
 
Jean Galbraith∗ 
 
In the last fifty years, empirical work in economics, psychology, 
sociology and other fields has produced increasingly powerful accounts of 
human behavior.  This work is clearly important at the individual level and 
often at the group level, but what – if anything – does it offer for 
international affairs?  Scholars grappling with this question must consider 
two issues:  relevance and proof.  Relevance goes to the degree to which 
insights developed in other settings actually explain how international 
affairs are conducted.  The issue of proof requires us to determine how 
confident we are about relevance or irrelevance.  How much weight do we 
assign to the strength of the underlying research, to deduction, to analogy, 
or to other evidence of a connection?  
 Different fields dealing with international affairs have taken different 
approaches.  Diplomatic studies lies at one end of the spectrum.  As a skim 
through the classic texts demonstrates, this field presumes that individual 
behavior matters to international affairs and has further embraced the 
relevance of research on individual and group behavior based on fairly low 
levels of proof.  Fred Iklé’s 1964 classic on How Nations Negotiate, for 
example, contained an entire chapter on “Personalities” and took into 
account existing psychological research on the bargaining process.1  
Subsequent scholars of diplomacy have similarly drawn on insights from 
empirical research conducted in other contexts.2  They acknowledge 
uncertainty about relevance, but nonetheless think it worthy of inclusion 
among the many lenses applied to the field.  As William Zartman and 
Maureen Berman put it, “one might well wonder about the value or 
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1 FRED CHARLES IKLÉ, HOW NATIONS NEGOTIATE 143-163 (1964); see also id. at 262-
264 (devoting a third of his bibliography to work on game theory, to psychological 
research on bargaining and expectations, and to studies on labor negotiations).  
2 E.g., I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN & MAUREEN R. BERMAN, THE PRACTICAL NEGOTIATOR 
4-6 (1982) (describing social scientific research on the bargaining process as an important 
strand of evidence for diplomacy); VICTOR A. KREMENYUK, ED., INTERNATIONAL 
NEGOTIATION 256-287 (2001) (containing a chapter on “Psychological Approach” by 
Jeffrey Rubin and one on “Cognitive Theory” by Christer Jönsson).   
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applicability of this new type of evidence, and yet the proper conclusion is 
that much of it needs to be translated rather dismissed.”3 
International legal scholarship has traditionally been less welcoming of 
empirically grounded research on individual and group behavior.  Although 
scholars engaged deeply with the question of how states behave in relation 
to international law, they did little to connect their theories with this 
empirical research.  Instead, they grounded their theories on observations 
drawn from legal practice4 or on assumptions of instrumental rationality.5  
But over the last decade, this has changed.  There is now a substantial – and 
rapidly growing – body of work that expressly approaches international law 
using insights on human behavior drawn from empirical research on 
individuals and groups, with special attention paid to developments in 
behavioral economics and cognitive psychology.6  This new wave of 
international legal scholarship posits the relevance of certain of these 
insights and seeks to demonstrate it through a variety of methods of proof. 
This chapter explores the potential for connections between micro-level 
empirical research and international affairs by focusing on a procedural 
mechanism used at all levels of human society.  This mechanism is 
deadlines.  Deadlines – predetermined points in time by which actions are 
due to be completed – feature in almost every kind of human interaction.  
Indeed, to date the preparation of this book chapter has involved three 
deadlines set by the editor (all scrupulously met) and numerous self-
imposed ones (none successfully met).  They are essential to individual 
achievement, social interaction, the conduct of business, and governmental 
operation.  In the international sphere, unfriendly deadlines were used at 
                                                 
3 ZARTMAN & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 5 (discussing several types of evidence, 
including empirical work from other contexts).  Some scholars working more generally in 
international relations also draw on insights from empirical work in domestic contexts.  
E.g., Jack S. Levy, Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining:  The Implications of Prospect 
Theory for International Conflict, 17 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 179 (1996). 
4 E.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY 
(1995); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law, 106 YALE L. J. 
2599 (1997); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).    
5 E.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2005); ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS (2008).  
6 E.g., Anne van Aaken, Behavioral International Law and Economics, 55 HARV. 
INT’L L. J. 421 (2014); Tomer Broude, Behavioral International Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 4 
(2015); Jean Galbraith, Treaty Options:  Towards a Behavioral Understanding of Treaty 
Design, 53 VA. J. IN’TL L. 309 (2013); Andrew K. Woods, A Behavioral Approach to 
Human Rights, 51 HARV. J. INT’L L. 51 (2010); see also Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, 
How to Influence States:  Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L. 
J. 621 (2004); RYAN GOODMAN ET AL., EDS. UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL ACTION, 
PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS (2012).  
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least as far back as the Peloponnesian War.7  Today deadlines are an 
inescapable part both of pre-law diplomacy and of the operation of 
international legal regimes, as I show in Part I through a case study of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Empirical research on deadlines in other contexts has the potential to be 
very useful for understanding how deadlines function in international legal 
practice.  For one thing, there is a great deal of research on deadlines in 
other contexts, but almost none on deadlines in international legal practice.8  
For another thing, as I discuss further in Part II.A, aspects of this research 
suggest that deadlines can function in non-intuitive ways.  These results 
come largely from experiments conducted in laboratory settings, which 
allow researchers to answer very precise questions with a high degree of 
causal certainty.  In these settings, psychologists have shown that deadlines 
can trigger or increase behavior grounded in bounded rationality.  For 
example, people tend to approach negotiations in more close-minded ways 
once deadlines are set and be more susceptible when making decisions 
under deadlines to whether choices are framed as losses or gains. 
If this research has relevance for international affairs, then it could 
prove quite helpful for diplomats, negotiators, executive figures in 
international organizations, and other international actors.  First, awareness 
of this research would make international actors more aware of when they 
may be acting under premises of bounded rationality and thus more capable 
of attempting “debiasing” strategies.9  Second, international actors could 
harness insights from this research in pursuit of their substantive goals.  By 
way of example, this research suggests that negotiators confronting 
complex issues should be wary of setting negotiating deadlines too early, 
that certain types of deadlines can have strategic values that go beyond what 
a rational choice model might predict, and that international actors seeking 
to encourage compliance on the part of others should take into account 
phenomena like the planning fallacy. 
Yet these practical payoffs all depend on the relevance of this research 
                                                 
7 THUCYDIDES, THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 482-83 (Richard Crawley 
trans. 1874) (describing how a Spartan leader “sent a herald to tell [the Athenians] that, if 
they would evacuate Sicily with bag and baggage within five days’ time, he was willing to 
make a truce accordingly”); see also, e.g., 1 Samuel 11:3 (“Give us seven days so we can 
send messengers throughout Israel; if no one comes to rescue us, we will surrender to 
you”). 
8 Deadlines have received a bit more attention in diplomatic studies.  See infra notes 
80-81 and accompanying text.   
9 For a general discussion of debiasing and its potential for effectiveness, see Jack B. 
Soll et al., A User’s Guide to Debiasing, in WILEY-BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT 
AND DECISION MAKING (Gideon Keren & George Wu, eds., forthcoming 2015), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2455986.  
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for international affairs.  In Part II.B, I take up the twin issues of relevance 
and of proof to date.  I begin by drawing analogies between findings from 
this research and the way in which deadlines have worked or failed to work 
in the context of the Chemical Weapons Convention.  These analogies 
suggest how insights from domestic research, if relevant, might explain 
aspects of the Convention and ways which it could have been improved.  I 
then consider the issue of proof for and against relevance.  This is an 
immensely complex question.  In my view, the evidence suggests that many 
of the empirical findings discussed here have at least modest relevance to 
uses of deadlines in international affairs.  But considerable uncertainty 
remains – and while this uncertainty could be reduced by future research, it 
can never be fully eradicated.  Accordingly, as I turn to in Part II.C, the 
most important question may be whether and when international actors 
should assume relevance in the face of uncertainty.  I suggest that more 
awareness of these issues and preliminary acceptance of their relevance 
would be valuable both in pre-law diplomacy and in international legal 
practice, despite certain differences between these two contexts.   
 
I.  DEADLINES IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE:  THE EXAMPLE OF THE 
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 
 
Deadlines are central to international legal practice.  They can be found 
almost anywhere one looks:  in the creation and entry into force of 
international agreements, in the terms set by international agreements, in the 
communications among nations and other international actors in relation to 
international legal obligations, in the operation of international 
organizations, and in the practice of international tribunals.  These deadlines 
are far from uniform in their legal effects.  Some have no legal effect at all, 
such as many negotiating deadlines.  Others mark a legal boundary of 
opportunity, such as the last date on which a particular treaty can be signed 
or a legal filing submitted to an international court.  Still other deadlines 
serve as a legal line between compliance and non-compliance with 
international obligations, such as ultimatums given by the Security Council 
or reporting deadlines set out in treaties.  Separate from these various legal 
effects (though often related to them), deadlines in international legal 
practice also vary substantially in their purposes and practical pliability.   
To illustrate these points, this section briefly highlights some uses of 
deadlines in relation to an important multilateral treaty: the Chemical 
Weapons Convention.10  This description illustrates how actors engaged in 
                                                 
10 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and use 
of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 
U.N.T.S. 45 (entered into force Apr. 29, 1997) [hereinafter “Chemical Weapons 
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international legal matters inevitably find themselves in the business of 
setting deadlines (or not setting them), working to meet deadlines (or 
sometimes failing to do so), and deciding what to do when they or others 
miss deadlines.  The discussion here does not exhaust the roles that 
deadlines can play in international legal practice.  But since the Convention 
relies more heavily on deadlines than do many other international regimes, 
this discussion does showcase a variety of ways in which deadlines can be 
used.  
Negotiation of the Convention.  Negotiations for the Chemical Weapons 
Convention occurred over many years,11 and, strikingly, there seems to have 
been little emphasis on negotiating deadlines until near the end of the 
process.  Discussions began during the late 1960s, when the Cold War 
superpowers signaled their openness to conversations about disarmament of 
biological and chemical weapons.  A 1925 treaty already prohibited the use 
of such weapons in war, but it did not address disarmament and in any event 
had not attracted comprehensive ratification.12  Under the auspices of a U.N. 
disarmament group that included both the United States and the Soviet 
Union, a treaty on biological weapons was negotiated by 1971.   The text of 
this treaty imposed an obligation on state parties to “continue negotiations 
in good faith” with regard to chemical weapons.13  These negotiations did 
continue, but for a long time did so without any emphasis on reaching 
conclusion.  In the mid to late 1980s, the negotiating process picked up, and 
the General Assembly began to pass resolutions urging the “final 
elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date.”14  Finally, in May 
1991, President George H.W. Bush announced the intention of the United 
                                                                                                                            
Convention”]. 
11 For a detailed history of the negotiations up to 1990, see Thomas Bernauer, THE 
PROJECTED CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION:  A GUIDE TO THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE 
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (1990); see also Julian Perry Robinson, The Negotiations 
on the Chemical Weapons Convention:  A Historical Overview, in THE NEW CHEMICAL 
WEAPONS CONVENTION:  IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS 17, 17-36 (M. Bothe et al., 
eds., 1998).   
12 That treaty is the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of 
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 
17, 1925, 94 L.N.T.S. 65.  Many states had attached reservations reserving the right to 
retaliate in kind if they were the victims of chemical or biological warfare, and the United 
States did not even become a party until 1975 (after the Vietnam War).  Bernauer, supra 
note 11, at 12, 15. 
13 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction art IX, Apr. 10, 
1972, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.   
14 G.A. Res 41/58 ¶ D.3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/58 (Dec. 3, 1986) (further urging the 
negotiators to submit a draft convention by the next General Assembly session); see also 
G.A. Res 42/37, U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/37 (Nov. 30, 1987); G.A. Res. 45/57, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/45/57A (Dec. 4, 1990).   
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States to “call for a target date to conclude the convention and recommend 
the Conference [on Disarmament] stay in continuous session if necessary to 
meet the target.”15  The negotiators then embraced a target deadline of one 
last year of negotiations.  This was not a deadline with legal effect, but it 
was a deadline that served to speed the negotiations along.  The final 
version of the treaty was sent on to the General Assembly in September 
1992.16 
Entry into Force of the Convention.  The Convention provided that it 
would enter into force 180 days after it received its sixty-fifth ratification.17  
The date the Convention entered into force – ultimately April 29, 1997 – 
served as a deadline for several kinds of legal opportunities.  For example, it 
marked the end of the Convention’s availability for signature.  This was 
mostly a matter of symbolism, as accession remained an option after the 
Convention entered into force.  Nonetheless, it triggered action:  while the 
overwhelming majority of signatories signed in 1993, which was the year 
the Convention opened for signature, four out of the eleven subsequent 
signatures were added in the single month of April 1997.18 
The entry-into-force date also served as a deadline in more important 
ways.  In the United States, it galvanized the Convention’s supporters from 
President Clinton on down to strive for the advice and consent of two-thirds 
of the Senate, as required for the ratification of treaties under Article II of 
the U.S. Constitution.19  In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on April 8, 1997, Secretary of State Madeline Albright 
powerfully described this date as a deadline whose legal and practical 
effects should inspire the Senate into action: 
                                                 
15 President George H.W. Bush, Statement on Chemical Weapons (May 13, 1991), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1991-book1/html/PPP-1991-book1-doc-
pg503.htm 
16 Robinson, supra note 11, at 29-30. 
17 Chemical Weapons Convention art. XXI(1) (further providing a two-year minimum 
between its opening for signature and its entry into force).   
18 Author’s calculations from United Nation Treaty Collection, MTDSG database entry 
on the Chemical Weapons Convention, available at 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-
3&chapter=26&lang=en (listing a total of 165 signatories, of whom 154 signed in 1993). 
19 For a description of how “with its back against the wall” the Clinton Administration 
collected endorsements from leading Republicans, cut side-deals with key Republican 
Senate leaders, and pushed the treaty through the Senate, see John V. Parachini, U.S. 
Senate Ratification of the CWC:  Lessons for the CTBT, THE NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 
62, 65-68 (Fall 1997).  See also, e.g., Steven Lee Myers, Clinton Mobilizes Bipartisan 
Effort on Chemical Arms, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 1997), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/05/world/clinton-mobilizes-bipartisan-effort-on-
chemical-arms.html (describing how “[t]he deadline of April 29 has given the issue a sense 
of urgency”). 
 Deadlines 7 
The CWC will enter into force on April 29.  Our goal is to 
ratify the agreement before then so that America will be an 
original party.  …  
[I]f we fail to ratify the agreement by the end of April: 
- we would forfeit our seat on the treaty’s Executive 
Council for at last a year, thereby costing us the chance 
to help draft the rules by which the Council will be 
enforced; 
- we would not be able to participate in the critical first 
sessions of the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons, which monitors compliance; 
- we would lose the right to help administer and conduct 
inspections; and 
- because of the trade restrictions imposed on non-member 
states, or chemical manufacturers are concerned that they 
would risk serious economic loss.20 
This rhetorical use of the entry-into-force date as a deadline exaggerated its 
actual importance.  Albright’s first concern was legitimate, although in 
practice the real deadline for it was likely a week or so later than the entry-
into-force date.21  The second and third concerns were not consequences of 
missing the entry-into-force date, but rather were more general 
consequences of not being party to the treaty.  Finally, as for the trade 
concerns alluded to, these would at first have applied only to chemicals 
used almost exclusively for chemical warfare and presumably thus not for 
the kinds of chemicals that U.S. manufacturers were exporting in practice.22   
Yet the impetus of the deadline proved “critical to moving the U.S. 
process of ratification”23 at a time when the Senate was generally hostile to 
                                                 
20 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Statement before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on Chemical Weapons Convention (Apr. 8, 1997), available at 
http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/970408.html (further adding “I have heard the 
argument that the Senate really need not act before April 29.  But as I have said, there are 
real costs attached to any such delay.”). 
21 The Conference of State Parties met on for its first session on May 6, 1997 and 
selected its Executive Council not long after that.  See OPCW, Report of the Organisation 
on the Implementation of the Convention 1 (Nov. 20, 1998), 
http://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=3953 [hereinafter 
OPCW 1998 Report]. 
22 Chemical Weapons Convention art. VI & Annex on Implementation and 
Verification.  For discussion, see Thilo Marauhn, National Regulations on Export Controls, 
in THE NEW CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION:  IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS, supra 
note 11, at 487, 490-92 (explaining how these restrictions at first applied only to Schedule 
1 chemicals, with restrictions on transfers of Schedule 2 and potentially Schedule 3 
chemicals to be phased in later). 
23 Parachini, supra note 19, at 62. 
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major treaties.  The Senate advised and consented to the treaty 74-26 on 
April 24, 1997.24  The United States ratified the Convention the next day, 
becoming one of fourteen countries to ratify in the week leading up to the 
Convention’s entry into force.25 
Deadlines in the text of the Convention.  The Convention was designed 
to achieve not only state commitment, but also state compliance.  Its text is 
permeated with deadlines – indeed, it is impossible to imagine how the 
Convention could function without them.  There are deadlines by which 
nations are to take certain actions, most notably for completing the 
destruction of their chemical weapons and of their production facilities for 
these weapons.26  There are deadlines related to the inspection process.27  
There are reporting deadlines for state parties.28  There are procedural 
deadlines related to how the international organization established by the 
Convention will operate.29  And there are other kinds of deadlines as well.30 
Unlike the negotiating deadlines and the entry-into-force deadline, most 
of these deadlines mark the legal line between compliance and non-
compliance.  Those countries that have failed to meet these deadlines are in 
violation of international law.  In particular, the United States and Russia 
have violated the Convention’s deadlines for the destruction of chemical 
stockpiles.31  The Convention requires state parties to destroy their chemical 
                                                 
24 Adam Clymer, Senate Approves Pact on Chemical Weapons after Lott Opens the 
Way, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 1997), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/25/world/senate-approves-pact-on-chemical-weapons-
after-lott-opens-way.html. 
25 Author’s calculations from United Nation Treaty Collection, MTDSG database entry 
on the Chemical Weapons Convention, available at 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-
3&chapter=26&lang=en (including Cuba, which ratified on the entry-into-force date). 
26 Chemical Weapons Convention art. IV(6) (providing that destruction is to be 
completed within ten years of the Convention’s entry into force for countries that are 
parties to the convention during that period); id. art. V(8) (providing similar deadlines for 
the destruction of production facilities); see also id. Annex on Implementation and 
Verification IV(A).C.24-26 (allowing the deadlines for destruction to be extended to up to 
five more years under certain conditions). 
27 Id. art. IX (providing very detailed deadlines that are triggered when State parties 
raise certain concerns or request inspections with regard to other state parties). 
28 E.g., id. art. III(1) (initial declarations due within 30 days of the Convention’s entry 
into force); id. art. IV(7) (specifying various other reporting deadlines); id. art. V(9) (more 
reporting deadlines). 
29 Id. art. VIII(B) (providing deadlines by which certain sessions must occur and by 
which certain reviews of the Convention must happen); id. art. VIII(D)(39) (providing a 
deadline for the Technical Secretariat to undertake certain steps) 
30 E.g., id. art. X(8)-(9) (identifying the deadline-laden process a state party can invoke 
if it believes chemical weapons have been used against it); id. art. XV (identifying 
deadlines in relation to the amendment process). 
31 See generally David A. Koplow, Train Wreck: The U.S. Violation of the Chemical 
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weapons, beginning “no later than two years after this Convention enters 
into force” for the parties and “finish[ing] not later than 10 years after entry 
into force of this Convention,” with certain intermediate deadlines as well.32   
There was also a possible further extension of up to five years.33  These 
deadlines were, in the later words of one U.S. official: 
inserted into the text with the vigorous support of the United States.  
With the information then available to us and the program projections 
then being used, the deadlines offered what we judged as a very safe 
margin [for the United States] while not allowing other states to 
procrastinate indefinitely in their own destruction programs.34 
But long before April 2012, the United States knew that it was not going to 
meet these deadlines, apparently due to a combination of environmental 
issues, not-in-my-backyard community concerns, and funding limitations.35  
It made a deliberate choice to be noncompliant rather than to ramp up its 
efforts to ensure compliance or to seek amendment of the Convention.36  In 
essence, U.S. officials appear to have calculated that as long as the U.S. 
continued making genuine, good-faith progress towards the destruction of 
chemical weapons, it could absorb the normative and reputational 
consequences of an international legal violation.37  The United States has 
now destroyed around 90% of the stockpile it declared in the 1990s, and 
Russia has destroyed around 60% of its declared stockpile.38 
                                                                                                                            
Weapons Convention, 6 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 319 (2013) (providing an excellent 
account of the U.S. non-compliance and also describing the non-compliance of Russia and 
certain other parties). 
32 Chemical Weapons Convention art. IV(6) (adding  that “A State Party is not 
precluded from destroying such chemical weapons at a faster rate”); id. Annex on 
Implementation and Verification IV(A).C.17-26.  The annex also includes intermediate 
deadlines – thus, each country is to destroy at least 1% of Category 1 chemical weapons 
within three years of the entry into force, 20% within five years, and 45% within seven 
years.  Id. Annex on Implementation and Verification IV(A).C.17.   
33 See id. Annex on Implementation and Verification IV(A).C.17-26. 
34 Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arms Control Implementation Donald A. Mahley, 
Statement on Chemical Weapons Demilitarization before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee’s Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capacities (Apr. 11, 2005), 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/44633.htm [hereinafter Mahley Statement]; see also 
Koplow, supra note 31, at 328 & n. 58 & 333 n. 84 (providing additional evidence of U.S. 
confidence at the time of ratification in its ability to meet the deadline).   
35 Koplow, supra note 31, at 334-338. 
36 Mahley Statement, supra note 34.  
37 Id. (stating that “I do not believe that we will damage our international influence 
fatally, if we have not completed our destruction by the deadline, so long as we are 
continuing to devote obvious and extensive efforts and resources to the program and so 
inform the other parties”); see generally Koplow, supra note 31 (describing and analyzing 
the approach taken by the U.S.).  
38 See Guy Taylor, Foot-Draggers:  U.S. and Russia Slow to Destroy Own Chemical 
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Supplemental Deadlines.  In addition to the deadlines written into the 
Convention itself, practice under the Convention can give rise to other 
deadlines.  Recent events regarding Syria provide an especially prominent 
example.  After the use of chemical weapons in Syria in 2013, a diplomatic 
resolution was reached whereby Syria acceded to the Convention and 
committed to destroying its chemical weapons.  The time frame developed 
for destruction involved a series of distinct deadlines: mustard gas 
was to be removed from Syria by December 31, 2013 and destroyed 
elsewhere by March 31, 2014; other declared chemicals were to be removed 
from Syria by February 5, 2014 and destroyed by June 30, 2014; and other 
deadlines were provided for containers and production facilities.39  Syria did 
not fully comply with these deadlines and egregiously appears to still be 
using chlorine and possibly other chemicals as a weapon.40  Nonetheless, it 
seems clear that the deadlines proved important in measuring and drawing 
salience to Syria’s degree of compliance41 – and thus likely improved the 
effectiveness of the process.  By August 28, 2014, 94% of Syria’s declared 
chemical weapons stockpile had been destroyed.42 
 
II.  DEADLINES AND BEHAVIOR:  RESEARCH AND CONUNDRUMS 
 
Deadlines abound in domestic affairs, just as they do in international 
ones.  Indeed, they are probably even more pervasive – and they are 
certainly much more studied.  There is an impressive body of empirical 
                                                                                                                            
Weapons amid Syria Smackdown, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2013), available at 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/22/us-and-russia-press-syria-but-are-
slow-to-destroy-/?page=all#pagebreak.  The U.S. and the Russians are not the only nations 
having difficulty with the timely destruction of chemical weapons – for example, under the 
Convention Japan has an obligation to destroy chemical weapons that it left in China 
during World War II, and this destruction is moving slowly.  See Koplow, supra note 31, at 
352. 
39 OPCW, Decision on Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical 
Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities 3 (Nov. 15, 2013), 
http://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/EC/M-34/ecm34dec01_e_.pdf. 
40 Somini Sengupta et al., Inspectors in Syria Find Traces of Banned Military 
Chemicals, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2015), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/13/world/middleeast/inspectors-in-syria-find-traces-of-
banned-military-chemicals.html?_r=0. 
41 For example, news coverage of Syria’s compliance with its agreement tended to be 
more intense around the time of deadlines and focused heavily on the deadlines.  E.g., Rick 
Gladstone, Syria to Miss Deadline on Weapons, Official Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2014, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/world/middleeast/chemical-weapons-
syria.html.   
42 OPCW Press Release, All Category 1 Chemicals Declared by Syria Now Destroyed 
(Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.opcw.org/news/article/opcw-all-category-1-chemicals-
declared-by-syria-now-destroyed/. 
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research on how deadlines function for individuals and to some extent 
groups, as well as some research on deadlines in relation to government 
regulation.  Interestingly, this research suggests that people tend to set and 
respond to deadlines in ways that reveal bounded rather than perfect 
rationality.  As one literature review bluntly puts it, “[g]iven the value of 
deadlines and how frequently people encounter them, it is surprising that 
people are poor at setting optimal deadlines for themselves.”43   
This section first engages with some of this social scientific research on 
deadlines, describing empirical work on deadlines in relation to 
negotiations, decision-making, project completion, and governmental 
regulation.  It then considers what relevance this research might have for 
international affairs by returning to example of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.  It next takes up the question of how much proof we have of 
relevance or irrelevance.  Finally, it considers the extent to which, in the 
absence of strong proof, practitioners in diplomacy and international law 
should care about domestic research on deadlines.   
 
A.  Empirical Research on Deadlines in Domestic Settings 
 
Deadlines are essential to human activity. They set priorities among 
different projects, coordinate activity among multiple actors, measure and 
incentivize compliance, and generally further action where delay is costly.  
Yet deadlines are a double-edged sword, as the values of avoiding delay are 
paired with the costs that come with haste.  Moreover, both the gains and 
the costs depend on human behavior in relation to deadlines – and 
especially on how rational people are in setting deadlines and in responding 
to them.   
In what follows, I briefly describe some empirical research on deadlines 
in four contexts – negotiation, decision-making, project completion, and 
administrative law.  More particularly, I focus on work which suggests that 
deadlines can trigger or exacerbate the cognitive biases that broader 
research in psychology and behavioral economics has shown to exist.  I thus 
do not address the pros and cons of deadlines under a theoretical framework 
grounded in rational choice.  I also omit considerable bodies of research 
(such as work in cultural studies) and even with respect to work on 
deadlines in psychology and behavioral economics, my discussion is 
necessarily incomplete.   
Negotiation.  Perhaps the area in which deadlines have received the 
most study has been negotiations between individuals.  Lab experiments 
                                                 
43 Don A. Moore & Elizabeth R. Tenney, Time Pressure, Performance, and 
Productivity, in LOOKING BACK, MOVING FORWARD:  A REVIEW OF GROUP AND TEAM-
BASED RESEARCH (Margaret Neal & Elizabeth Mannix, eds., 2012) at 316-17. 
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have studied many aspects of time pressure of negotiations, including how 
it affects strategy,44 how it affects concessions and perceptions of 
concessions,45 and how it affects the quality of agreements.  One important 
and well-substantiated result is that time constraints lead to less innovative 
negotiations – i.e., to negotiations that focus on dividing the pie rather than 
identifying ways to increase its size.46  More focused work suggests that this 
result does not simply reflect the fact that less time provides less 
opportunity for thinking of creative solutions.  Instead, it stems at least 
partly from a cognitive shift:  when people feel themselves under time 
pressure, they are more likely to close off their minds and rely on pre-
existing assumptions.47   
Decision-making.  In the individual decision-making context, research 
suggests that deadlines encourage people to exercise options.48  Research 
also suggests that deadlines magnify the power of heuristics.  As one 
literature review puts it, “Decision makers under time pressure … are less 
likely to revise their initial impressions, are less likely to deviate from 
habitual modes of attribution, are more likely to rely on cognitive heuristics, 
are less accurate, and are less confident in the accuracy of their decisions.”49  
Where a deadline prevents an individual from gathering and absorbing all 
                                                 
44 E.g., Uri Gneezy et al., Bargaining under a Deadline:  Evidence from the Reverse 
Ultimatum Game, 45 GAMES & ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 347 (2003) (finding in lab 
experiments that individuals take advantage of strategic possibilities presented by deadlines 
– such as by trying to make offers close enough to deadlines that they force binary options 
upon their negotiating partners – but don’t do so as much as rational choice predictions 
would suggest). 
45 E.g., Igor Mosterd & Christel G. Rutte, Effects of Time Pressure and Accountability 
to Constituents on Negotiation, 22 INT’L J. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 227 (2000) (finding  
in lab experiments that when acting under time pressure negotiators are more likely to 
make concessions on their own behalf but less likely to make them on behalf of their 
principals); Don. A Moore, Myopic Biases in Strategic Social Prediction:  Why Deadlines 
Put Everyone Under More Pressure Than Everyone Else, 31 PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 
668 (2005) (finding in lab experiments that people tend to overestimate the degree to which 
their own deadlines will harm them in the negotiating process). 
46 See Carsten K.W. De Dreu, Time Pressure and Closing of the Mind in Negotiation, 
91 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 280, 280-282 (2003) 
(reviewing the literature on this issue).  
47 Id. at 286-90.  This experiment gave two groups of subjects exactly the same amount 
of time for a negotiation, but told one group that this time was more than enough to 
complete the negotiation and told the other group that this time limit would make things 
tight.  Negotiating pairs from the group told that that time limit would make things tight 
proved significantly less likely to come to innovative agreements that grew the pie.  Id.   
48 See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir et al., It’s Now or Never! (working paper), available 
at http://law.huji.ac.il/upload/Deadline.LEWINSOHN.ZAMIR.RITOV.pdf (finding that 
individuals are more likely to take action when asked to do so under a deadline in contexts 
such as providing optional feedback). 
49 Moore & Tenney, supra note 43, at 307 (citations omitted). 
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the information she would ideally like to have in order to make a decision, 
then reliance on heuristics may sometimes be a rational strategy.  But 
research suggests that deadlines may also increase the power of irrational 
biases as well.  One of the core insights in behavioral economics is that 
people can be responsive to framing effects.  For example, they may 
respond differently to the same event depending on whether this event is 
characterized as a gain or a loss, because their aversion to perceived losses 
is greater than their pleasure at perceived gains.50  Time pressure appears to 
magnify framing effects in relation to loss aversion.  In one lab experiment, 
each subject was asked how likely it was that he/she would tell a potential 
buyer of a stereo that another offer had also been received, when in fact 
there was no such other offer.51  For some subjects, the instructions framed 
the transaction as a gain (they had a “25% chance of gaining” a sale) while 
for other subjects the instructions framed the transaction as a way to avoid a 
loss (they had a “75% chance of losing out on” a sale).52  Where the 
subjects were encouraged to respond as quickly as possible, they showed 
high susceptibility to the framing effects. Those for whom the transaction 
was framed as a loss were significantly more likely to answer that they 
would claim another offer had been received.53   
Project completion.  Research from a variety of contexts suggests that 
individuals and groups suffer from a “planning fallacy” of over-optimism 
about how long it takes to get things done.54  Deadlines are often essential 
to generating action, even though people do not always meet them. 
Yet deadlines do not always work quite in the ways we might rationally 
predict.  Although a rational choice approach might posit that individuals do 
better with maximum flexibility (since then they have the most options for 
how to rationally allocate their time), the existence of intermediate 
deadlines can noticeably improve performance.  One field experiment by 
Dan Ariely and Klaus Wertenbroch gave proof-readers three error-laden 
texts to read and randomly divided them to one of three conditions:  first, 
                                                 
50 E.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. 
PSYCH. 341, 343-44 (1984); William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in 
Decision Making, 1 J OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 7, 35-36 (1988). 
51 Mary C. Kern & Dolly Chugh, Bounded Ethicality:  The Perils of Loss Framing, 20 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 378, 380 (2009).   
52 Id. 
53 Id. By contrast, the frames in this experiment had basically no effect for subjects 
who were told to take their time in answering.  Id.   
54 DANIEL KAHNEMAN & AMOS TVERSKY, INTUITIVE PREDICTION: BIASES AND 
CORRECTIVE PROCEDURES 2-2 (1977); Roger Buehler et al., Collaborative Planning and 
Prediction:  Does Group Discussion Affect Optimistic Biases in Time Estimation, 97 ORG. 
BEHAV. AND HUMAN DECISIONS PROCESSES 47 (2005) (finding the planning fallacy to exist 
in group predictions in both laboratory and real-world projects and to be even stronger than 
with regard to individual predictions).   
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where all three texts were due back at the end of three weeks, second, where 
one text was due back a week for three weeks; and third, where the proof-
readers set their own deadlines (with an outer limit of three weeks).55  The 
proof-readers with the assigned weekly deadlines caught the most errors, 
the proof-readers with the single deadline after three weeks caught the least 
errors, and the group with self-imposed deadlines performed in the 
middle.56 
Other research suggests that the first intermediate deadline can play an 
outsized role in setting the pace on a project.  In one laboratory experiment, 
small groups were given the same total amount of time to complete a 
project, but were randomly assigned to different sets of intermediate 
deadlines.57  Thus, one set of groups had first 5 minutes, then 10 minutes, 
then 20 minutes for an anagram-solving project, while the other set of 
groups had first 20 minutes, then 10 minutes, then 5 minutes for the same 
project.  The first set of groups – the ones given shorter initial deadlines – 
were more substantially productive than the second set of groups.58  Several 
other laboratory experiments have found similar “rate persistence.”59   
Regulatory/Legal Deadlines.  The deadlines discussed so far in this 
section have mostly been small-stakes affairs and it is hard to know the 
extent to which they scale up to matters of great importance.  In addition, 
these deadlines have also not carried the force of law, and it may be that the 
normative or practical risks of legal violations trigger different behavioral 
instincts (or at least different magnitudes).  Although research on legal 
deadlines is more limited, there is some observational work on their role, 
particularly in U.S. regulatory law.  In keeping with the other findings on 
deadlines, this research suggests that deadlines are often not used to best 
effect.  Regulatory deadlines set in statutes are frequently far too over-
optimistic, in a manner evocative of the planning fallacy.  Agencies often 
miss legal deadlines, and even when they make the deadlines it is 
sometimes at the expense of other tasks that lack deadlines but that may in 
fact have more substantive importance.60  In one case study of EPA 
                                                 
55 Dan Ariely & Klaus Wertenbroch, Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance:  
Self-Control by Precommitment, 13 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 219 (2002) (also conducting 
a similar experiment with term papers by executive-education students).   
56 Id. at 222-223 (noting that all differences were statistically significant).   
57 Joseph E. McGrath et al., The Social Psychology of Time: Entrainment of Behavior 
in Social and Organizational Settings, 5 APP. SOC. PSYCH. MAN. 21, 30-31 (1984). 
58 Id.  
59 Moore and Tenney, supra note 43, at 315-16. 
60 Alden F Abbot, The Case Against Federal Statutory and Judicial Deadlines:  a 
Cost-Benefit Appraisal, 39 ADMIN L REV 171, 181-183 (1987); see also Jacob E. Gersen & 
Anne Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 UNIV. OF PA. L. REV. 923, 
973-975 (2008) (considering how deadlines may distort agency priorities in undesirable 
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decision-making under deadlines, Philip Bromily and Alfred Marcus found 
that time pressure imposed by deadlines combined with agency habits of 
routine in ways that minimized innovation.61  Their account bears 
considerable resemblance to the findings described above in the individual 
context regarding how deadlines can close minds and overly increase 
reliance on preexisting heuristics.  
 
B.  Domestic Research and International Legal Practice 
 
What if anything does this domestic research on deadlines tell us about 
international legal practice?  This section takes up this question – first in an 
indirect manner, and then in a more direct one.  I begin indirectly by 
assuming the relevance of this research and considering what it might 
suggest about the use of deadlines in the Chemical Weapons Convention.  
This discussion is meant as an example of how insights from domestic 
research, if relevant, could be useful in international legal design.  I then 
turn directly to the question of how much proof we have of the relevance of 
these insights. 
 
1. The Chemical Weapons Convention’s Deadlines in Light of Domestic 
Research on Deadlines 
 
As discussed earlier, the Chemical Weapons Convention has involved 
many different kinds of deadlines – including negotiating deadlines, 
decision-making deadlines, and legally binding deadlines for project 
completion.  There are interesting parallels between the role played by these 
deadlines and the empirical research on deadlines described above. 
First, returning to the negotiation of the Convention, it is notable how 
little emphasis there was on deadlines until near the end of the process.  If 
we assume the relevance of the domestic research discussed above, we 
would expect that this furthered the likelihood that the negotiations would 
produce an innovative, surplus-producing agreement.  Because of the 
absence of deadlines in the formative years of the negotiations, time 
pressure is unlikely to have served either as an objective constraint or as a 
subjective constraint that caused the closing of minds.  And, indeed, in the 
                                                                                                                            
ways); Daniel Carpenter et al., The Complications of Controlling Agency Time Discretion:  
FDA Review Deadlines and Postmarket Drug Safety, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 98 (2012) 
(finding that drugs approved right before FDA statutory deadlines tend to have more safety 
problems than drugs approved at other times, and concluding that this is likely due to 
differences in time pressure). 
61 Philip Bromiley & Alfred Marcus, Deadlines, Routine, and Change, 20 POLICY 
SCIENCES 85, 87-93 (1987); but see id. at 93-98 (finding that deadlines helped trigger more 
substantial changes where there was  a preexisting period of turmoil). 
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Chemical Weapons Convention we see a remarkably creative agreement by 
international legal standards.  It is “unprecedented in its scope”62 and 
contains a robust and unusual compliance scheme.63 
Second, considering the ratification of the Convention by the United 
States, it is striking how significant the entry-into-force date proved to this 
process.  As discussed earlier, the practical importance of meeting this 
deadline was modest at best, but its power as a rallying force was immense.  
Conveniently, the deadline came towards the beginning of the legislative 
session, rather than at the packed end of a term.64  The deadline made it 
easier for the treaty’s supporters to frame timely ratification in a way that 
would trigger loss aversion – i.e., that failure to ratify by the entry into force 
date would be an opportunity that would be lost forever if not exercised.  
Madeline Albright’s testimony emphasized the losses that would follow 
from non-ratification by the deadline: the United States would “forfeit” its 
Executive Council seat, “lose the right” to set inspections in motion, and 
“risk serious economic loss” for U.S. industry.65   
Third, regarding how the Convention’s deadlines are working in 
practice, it is clear that many of these deadlines have not been met.  
Research on deadlines in the domestic context, if relevant, may shed some 
light on how these deadlines have and have not worked.  Research on the 
planning fallacy would predict that the Convention’s deadlines would be 
over-optimistic, and indeed this has proved to be the case.  Some of the 
Convention’s deadlines were probably known to be aspirational when put 
into place.66  Yet the fact that the United States has missed the final 
deadline for destruction of chemical weapons is one that may not have been 
predicted at the beginning.  As discussed earlier, the United States thought 
that the deadlines would allow it plenty of time.  It was too sanguine about 
the technical ease of the destruction process and also failed to take 
adequately into account environmental issues and not-in-my-backyard 
resistance.  In consequence, we have what David Koplow describes as an 
                                                 
62 Clinton Letter of Transmittal November 23, 1993. 
63 See Bothe et al., Conclusions, in THE NEW CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION:  
IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS, supra note 11, at 591 (discussing how the Convention 
is “an unprecedented instrument if compared with the provisions of other international 
disarmament agreements”).   
64 By way of contrast, the Law of the Sea Convention entered into force in November 
1994, right around the end of a Congressional session.  It got no traction at that time and, 
despite powerful supporters, has still not received U.S. ratification.  See Jean Galbraith, 
Prospective Advice and Consent, 37 YALE J. IN’TL L. 247, 302 (2012). 
65 Albright, supra note 20.   
66 For example, the requirement that nations submit initial declarations within thirty 
days of the CWC’s entry into force had an initial compliance rate of around a third.  OPCW 
1998 Report, supra note 21, at 3-4 (noting that another third came in over the next five 
months). 
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“international law train wreck” – despite being a “prime mover in 
negotiating and implementing” the Chemical Weapons Convention, the 
United States has “fall[en] into [a] conspicuous violation.”67   
Perhaps the Convention’s negotiators could have made better initial 
choices with regard to the destruction deadlines.  If phenomena like the 
planning fallacy and rate persistence are applicable at the international law 
level and negotiators are aware that this is the case, then negotiators might 
factor these issues into compliance design.  If they factored in concerns 
about the planning fallacy, for example, negotiators might have structured 
the compliance regime differently to make more provision for reasonable 
but unsuccessful efforts to meet the deadlines.  Relatedly, the design of 
intermediate deadlines in the Convention seem problematic if one is 
conscious of rate persistence.  These deadlines – 1% destruction by three 
years, 20% within 5 years, and 45% within 7 years68 – assumed that 
destruction would ramp up sharply over time (presumably based on 
technological assumptions).  But if rate persistence is indeed a concern, then 
this uphill design is problematic.  It might have been better to set higher 
targets earlier, even though the risk of missing these targets would also 
higher.  An approach like this was in fact taken with respect to Syria.  The 
initial deadlines were quite ambitious and were not met.  Yet they proved 
quite effective in furthering the prompt destruction of most of Syria’s 
declared chemical weapons. 
As this discussion suggests, if domestic research on deadlines is 
relevant, then it could be quite useful to diplomats and other international 
actors. Quite unintentionally, the Chemical Weapons Convention may have 
harnessed behavioral mechanisms that benefitted it.  Although the absence 
of initial negotiating deadlines stemmed from Cold War realities, it may 
have proved valuable in enabling the development of a far-reaching and 
creative agreement.  And although the triggers attached to the entry-into-
force provisions had other purposes, they ended up helping the 
Convention’s U.S. supporters rally around the entry-into-force date and to 
frame non-ratification by that date as a loss for the United States.  In the 
future, diplomats could use these mechanisms more strategically.  Similarly, 
if the domestic research on deadlines is relevant to international regime 
design, than it has important implications for how deadlines can most 
effectively further compliance on the part of states and other international 
actors.   
 
                                                 
67 Koplow, supra note 31, at 319. 
68 Chemical Weapons Convention Annex on Implementation and Verification 
IV(A).C.17 (containing the deadlines for Category 1 substances).   
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2. The Challenge of Proving Relevance or Irrelevance 
 
This section considers how relevant the domestic research on deadlines 
discussed here is to international legal practice.  Broadly speaking, I focus 
on two related forms of proof:  first, evidence addressing the broader 
relevance of behavioral principles to international legal practice; and, 
second, evidence specific to the use of deadlines.  Taken together, I think 
the evidence suggests that this domestic research is relevant (and more than 
trivially so), but also that this evidence is not conclusive. 
Behavioral Principles.  There is an increasing body of work linking 
behavioral insights to international legal practice.  A core insight in favor of 
this connection is deductive:  evidence strongly suggests that bounded 
rationality is a general human trait and, after all, international legal practice 
is ultimately the work product of humans.  Against this is doubt about 
whether international actors partake of behavioral traits in ways predictable 
enough to be helpful in understanding international legal practice.  This 
doubt stems from the potential heterogeneities between domestic 
experimental subjects and international decision-makers, the group-based 
nature of international decision-making, and the complexity of international 
issues and processes.  Empirical work is increasingly bridging this gap and 
showing that, at least in some contexts, the connection holds.  This work 
includes research showing that groups also display bounded rationality 
(though with somewhat different emphases)69 and work indicating bounded 
rationality on the part of international actors in certain contexts.  In prior 
work on treaty clauses allowing states to either opt in or to opt out of 
International Court of Justice jurisdiction, for example, I have shown that 
states behavior does not follow the predictions of a rational choice model 
but rather parallels findings from domestic behavioral research.70 
The more that behavioral principles are shown to be at work in 
international legal practice in certain contexts, the stronger the case is for 
concluding that behavioral principles are at work as well in other contexts.  
Yet this inference can only be a cautious one.  The relationship between 
behavioral principles and outcomes is heavily context dependent and 
requires “due regard for the relevant decision-making capacities of the 
actors in [their] specific setting.”71 
                                                 
69 van Aaken, supra note 6 , at 446-49 (Part II) (describing some of this work). 
70 See generally Galbraith, supra note 6; see also Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulson & 
Emma Aisbett, When the Claim Hits:  Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bounded Rational 
Learning, 65 WORLD POLITICS (2013) (demonstrating through interviews of international 
decision-makers that bounded rather than ideal rationality drove certain decision-making in 
relation to bilateral investment treaties and complementing this with quantitative work 
suggesting a similar conclusion).   
71 Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Sciences:  Removing 
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Deadline-Specific Evidence.  With regard to the use of deadlines, I think 
the evidence supports a connection between at least some of the empirical 
findings in domestic contexts discussed above and international legal 
practice.  The broader principles developed from this research – that low 
time pressure fosters more creative agreements, that framing matters, and 
that the planning fallacy is common – have evidentiary support from a 
variety of contexts.  Observational findings in the domestic regulatory 
context, as discussed above, appear consistent with these principles.  The 
prevalence of these findings suggests that they will likely prove true in 
international legal contexts.  Moreover, some matters of international legal 
practice are largely domestic in practice, including ratification and aspects 
of implementation.  Here, the parallels to the domestic regulatory context 
are even stronger. 
We also have some initial work connecting behavioral patterns from the 
domestic context to the international context.  I offered the case study of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention above primarily to show how empirical 
findings in the domestic context, if relevant, could help with good regime 
design, but I think this case study is also suggestive of relevance.  For 
example, the U.S. failure to meet its destruction obligations seems like a 
straight-forward case of the planning fallacy.  Far more extensively, Marco 
Pinfari has explored the role of deadlines in peace negotiations, using four 
case studies and data drawn from sixty-eight negotiations.72  While, as 
noted earlier, work in diplomatic studies has historically been quite open to 
drawing inferences from domestic empirical work, Pinfari’s work is the 
most up-to-date exploration of how domestic empirical research on 
negotiating deadlines might relate to their use internationally.73  Pinfari 
finds a negative correlation between peace negotiations undertaken under 
conditions of time pressure and the ultimate durability of resulting 
agreements.74  Pinfari concludes that “this analysis goes some way to 
confirming the argument that emerges from a variety of works in 
experimental psychology according to which the absence or low levels of 
time pressure can be associated with positive negotiation results in the 
presence of elements of complexity.”75  Based on his findings, Pinfari 
                                                                                                                            
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1057-58 
(2000).   
72 MARCO PINFARI, PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND TIME:  DEADLINE DIPLOMACY IN 
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES (2013).  
73 See id. at 1-10 (discussing prior work in diplomatic studies in relation to deadlines).   
74 Id. at 57-61, 138-39.  He does not have sufficient power to apply regression analyses 
and look for statistical significance, and instead uses a fuzzy set methodology. 
75 Id. at 138.  Pinfari cautions wariness, however, about uncritical application of lab-
based insights to international negotiations, showing how one result suggested by a lab 
experiment was not in fact born out in one of his case studies.  See id. at 143-44. 
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suggests that “[d]iplomats, mediators, and any actor involved in conflict 
resolution efforts should thus be aware of the fact that little evidence exists 
to suggest that [artificially imposed] pressure results in durable agreements 
in complex negotiations.”76  His conclusions are in line with what a French 
diplomat recently tweeted in relation to on-going negotiations with Iran:  
“Instead of dramatizing a so-called ‘deadline’, let’s get the substance of a 
possible agreement right.  Much more important.”77 
Although supportive of the relevance of behavioral principles to the 
international use of deadlines, there is nonetheless considerable grounds for 
doubt.  Case studies may be a matter of looking under the light and in any 
event may support alternative causal hypotheses.  Perhaps deadlines have 
played an entirely rational role in the Chemical Weapons Convention.  The 
innovative agreement could stem not from open minds occasioned by the 
absence of deadlines, but rather by good negotiators taking sensible 
advantage of additional time; the entry-into-force date may have served as a 
rational focal point for President Clinton and the Senate; and the U.S. 
failure to destroy its chemical weapons by the compliance deadline may 
have been due not to an initial planning fallacy, but rather to strategic non-
compliance or a rational change in priorities.  I read the evidence as solidly 
supporting a behavioral account in relation to the second and third issue 
(and unclear on the first issue), but I cannot conclusively rule out these 
alternatives.  Pinfari’s results are similarly vulnerable to alternative 
explanations.  For example, low time pressure could correlate to better 
outcomes in peace negotiations because better negotiators and mediators 
happen to prefer patient approaches.  Alternatively, the correlation could be 
explained simply by the objective benefits that come with more time for 
deliberation. 
Much more research is needed to fine-tune our understanding of how 
deadlines operate in the international legal context and the ways in which 
behavioral principles are applicable.  The particulars matter, and the 
evidence on the particulars is less than ideal.  For example, it is hard to 
know how strongly the laboratory-grounded finding that deadlines 
subjectively close minds translates to actors working with long-term rather 
than immediate deadlines.  Similarly, while the planning fallacy is well-
supported, there is less strong evidence about how best to overcome it or 
harness it.  The increased use of well-structured intermediate deadlines 
seems like a mechanism with promise, but more work would be useful in 
assessing this.  As another example, some international legal deadlines may 
trigger salience biases and draw outsized attention to issues (relative to what 
                                                 
76 Id. at 150. 
77 Gérard Araud, Twitter (March 29, 2015, 4:54 PM EST), 
https://twitter.com/GerardAraud/status/582330027053809664?lang=en. 
 Deadlines 21 
we would rationally expect) by states and non-state actors as well.78  Case 
studies, quantitative observational work, and perhaps some elite-focused 
experiments would help elucidate these issues.  Especially in the absence of 
field experiments – and these are functionally impossible in most real-world 
international legal contexts79 – we must operate against a backdrop of 
uncertainty about causal mechanisms and continually update our best 
understandings in light of additional evidence. 
   
C.  Deadlines, Diplomacy, International Law 
 
Proof of the degree and manner of relevance of domestic research on 
deadlines to international legal practice remains modest.  Yet the question 
of relevance is one of immediate practical importance.  If deadlines tend to 
trigger a subjective closing of the minds of international negotiators, for 
example, then perhaps negotiators should undertake extra efforts to avoid 
setting deadlines early on (even at the cost of shorter ones down the road).  
If deadlines make the costs of not ratifying a treaty unusually salient, then 
perhaps important treaties should tie more consequences to ratification by 
particular dates.  If the planning fallacy holds for international actors, then 
we should predict considerable non-compliance with international legal 
deadlines despite good faith intentions.  If states are susceptible to rate 
persistence, then negotiators, executive actors in international organizations, 
and non-state actors might want to strive to structure compliance regimes to 
take advantage of this susceptibility.  The more international actors exhibit 
behavioral tendencies, the more these tendencies should matter for the 
design and implementation of timing mechanisms. 
Given uncertainty, what should practitioners take into account in setting 
deadlines?  The fields of law and diplomacy have traditionally taken 
different approaches to these questions.  Work in international law says 
very little about deadline design generally.  By contrast, scholarship in 
diplomatic studies, including scholarship aimed at practitioners, has 
historically included considerable discussion of negotiating deadlines.  This 
discussion tends to identify all kinds of considerations, including empirical 
                                                 
78 Cf. Galbraith, supra note 6, at 353-355 (explaining how the greater ratification rates 
of optional protocols, as opposed to legally equivalent opt-in clauses, might be explained 
by salience biases on the part of states or of advocacy groups).   
79 While some forms of field experiments may be plausible in international law, see 
Adam Chilton & Dustin Tingley Why the Study of International Law Needs Experiments, 
52 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 176, 233-38 (2013) (giving examples of a field experiment using 
random assignment of electoral monitors and another email-based audit study of firms 
providing transnational incorporation services), the challenges of running power-generating 
experiments on actual diplomatic negotiations, the entry into force of treaties, or many 
forms of international legal implementation seem effectively insurmountable.   
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research in other contexts,80 but to avoid drawing strong conclusions.81  
Importantly, even where this work does offer specific suggestions based on 
behavioral research, as with Pinfari’s work, the focus is exclusively on 
negotiating deadlines, rather than on the kind of deadlines that negotiators 
might put into agreements. 
More awareness about empirically grounded insights from other 
contexts on deadlines and bounded rationality would be valuable to 
international practitioners, even though considerable uncertainty remains 
about the applicability of these insights.  This awareness should be holistic 
in nature.  Whether diplomats, international lawyers, or others, practitioners 
engaged in negotiations can potentially benefit not only from insights 
regarding negotiating deadlines, but also from insights regarding optimal 
deadline design for decision-making and project-completion purposes.  
After all, in the international legal context it is typically negotiators who set 
compliance deadlines (and most other forms of deadlines as well).  
Conversely, international actors involved in meeting deadlines – whether 
diplomats, international lawyers, or others – could benefit from awareness 
of how bounded rationality might have affected the choices of negotiators in 
setting the deadlines as well as in thinking about how bounded rationality 
might affect choices related to compliance with these deadlines.   
In making this call for awareness, I do not mean to equate international 
diplomacy and international law.  As an empirical matter, diplomatic 
deadlines and international legal deadlines may trigger different behavioral 
effects on actors – for example, to the extent that law makes a deadline for 
opportunity clearly a firm one, actors might feel greater loss aversion to 
missing the deadline.  Moreover, there is an important normative difference 
between deadlines for political decision-making and deadlines for legal 
compliance, as missing the latter kind of deadline puts a country in violation 
of its international legal obligations.  Yet to the extent that behavioral 
tendencies cut across these differences, practitioners on both the diplomacy 
side and the legal side should take them into account among the many other 
factors that inform decision-making. 
                                                 
80 E.g, IKLÉ, supra note 1, at 72-80 (posing a number of considerations in relation to 
deadlines, although relying heavily on examples from past international negotiations); 
ZARTMAN & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 191-199 (drawing on a variety of sources in 
discussing deadlines); Dean Pruitt, Strategy in Negotiation, in KREMENYUK, supra note 2, 
at 89; cf. ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES 141 (1991) (approaching negotiations as a 
unitary field across domestic and international contexts and discussing practices on 
deadlines in labor negotiations). 
81 E.g., ZARTMAN AND BERMAN, supra note 2, at 194 (concluding rather unhelpfully 
that “[d]eadlines tend to facilitate agreement, lower expectations, call bluffs, and produce 
final proposals, but also lead negotiators to adopt a tough position that will make them look 
good if – and therefore when – the negotiations fail”).  
 Deadlines 23 
Going beyond awareness, I also think practitioners should rely on 
insights developed from domestic research on bounded rationality in setting 
and responding to deadlines, at least to a modest extent.  An easy case is 
where a practitioner is choosing between options which have different 
implications from a behavioral perspective but otherwise look equally good.  
Madeline Albright’s testimony on the Chemical Weapons Convention is an 
example.  She could have framed ratification by the entry-into-force date as 
a gain for the United States, or she could have framed non-ratification by 
that date as a loss for the United States.  If framing does not matter, than 
either approach should sound equally persuasive, but if framing can trigger 
loss aversion, then the latter approach would do more to accomplish her 
goal of U.S. ratification.  Therefore, she should have – and did – frame non-
ratification by the entry into force date as a loss for the United States. 
Other situations will require more complicated calculations.  Consider, 
for example, the issue of how to set optimal compliance deadlines.  On the 
one hand, projections about when compliance can be achieved are likely to 
be over-optimistic.  But if deadlines are too early, then they can no longer 
serve as a useful boundary for separating actors striving in good faith from 
actors who are willfully non-compliant.  Moreover, once these deadlines are 
past, even good faith actors may be less motivated to achieve compliance, 
since their default has become non-compliance.  On the other hand, 
deadlines help motivate action, especially since “work expands so as to fill 
the time available for its completion.”82  If deadlines are set to compensate 
for the planning fallacy and to accommodate the slowest actors, then actors 
who could comply more promptly may nonetheless wait until the deadlines 
and the least capable actors may wait too long to get started.  These kinds of 
calculations will necessarily be heavily context-dependent, but there should 
be a thumb on the scale in favor of design choices that accord with 
behavioral insights. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
Where the use of deadlines and other procedural design mechanisms are 
concerned, scholars of both diplomacy and international law should 
consider the relevance of existing empirical research in psychology and 
behavioral economics.  The case study of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention offered in this chapter shows how this research might help 
explain features of international legal design and improve it going forward.  
The discussion here is only a tentative starting point.  Much more work is 
needed to establish just how relevant the various strands of this research are 
                                                 
82 Parkinson’s Law, The Economist (Nov. 19, 1955), available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/14116121.   
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and, more generally, how deadlines can best be used in international legal 
practice.  In the meantime, practitioners would do well to consider what 
principles of bounded rationality suggest about the effective use of 
deadlines.    
 
